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Abstract 
The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern 
formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives 
rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act.  Despite this there has been a lack 
of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; 
both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process.  The purpose of this article 
is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency law 
in Australia. 
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Introduction 
 
The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern 
formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives 
rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act.  Despite this there has been a lack 
of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; 
both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process.  The purpose of this article 
is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency 
law in Australia. 
This paper argues that a robust analysis of the statutory demand regime is overdue. The paper first 
sets out to discover if there is a policy justification for the process and to articulate what that may 
be. Second, it will briefly examine the current legislation and argue that the structure by its design 
actually encourages litigation which is arguably undesirable in the context of insolvency. In particular 
we question whether the current rigid legal regime is appropriate for dealing efficiently with the 
highly charged atmosphere of contested insolvency and is drafted in such a way that leaves some 
doubt as to whether the process might be open to abuse.  Third, it will examine suggested reforms in 
this area as to whether they might be a way forward.  
 
Background 
The statutory demand process dates back to the beginning of the modern forms of company 
legislation. Assaf has traced a form of the statutory demand process back to s 7 of the Winding Up 
Act 1844 (UK)1 whereby an affidavit alleging the debt could be filed in a court and served on the 
company. Then, the company was required to pay within one month after the service or be deemed 
to have committed an act of bankruptcy. The further development in the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1856 (UK) saw the provision for a statutory demand procedure as we would recognise it today.2 The 
statutory demand procedure in Australia was adopted within the various colonies in much the same 
                                                          
1 Assaf F., Statutory Demands: Law and Practice, 2nd ed,LexisNexis, Sydney, 2012 at [1.13]. 
2 See s 68. The legislation set up the basic process for winding up by the court. It  provided for the  winding  up 
by the  in a number  of  circumstances,  including  “Whenever the  Company is  unable  to pay its Debts” 
(under s 67). The next section then deemed  the  company to be  unable  to pay its debts if  a creditor who 
was owed a minimum amount had served on the  company a demand and the  company failed to pay, secure  
or  compound  within a period  of  three  weeks succeeding the service. 
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form and remained largely unaltered until the passing of the Harmer3 reforms in 1993 following the 
passing of the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth).4 The Harmer Report was the basis of the 
changes that lie at the heart of the issues raised here. It is, therefore, important to examine the basis 
of the comments in that report. 
At the time of the Harmer Report5 it was noted that the statutory demand procedure was largely 
unregulated.  This raised a problem in the Commission’s view that6 
..too often produces disputes about the debt at the hearing of a winding up application. The 
Commission is anxious that this should be avoided. Further, companies often need to bring 
injunction proceedings where a debt claimed in a demand is disputed. The Commission is of 
the view that the legislation should specifically provide for the determination of disputed 
debt issues and other disputes in respect of a statutory demand.  
Exactly what was the “problem” associated with dealing with the dispute as to debts at the time of 
the winding up hearing was not made entirely clear.7 It may be that the problem was one of 
separating the issues of compliance with the formalities of the demand from the underlying issue of 
whether the company is insolvent. Alternatively it may be that there were simply concerns with the 
timing of the challenge.  Perhaps it might also have been some combination of these two  matters. 
The Harmer Report was also concerned with the need to provide a mechanism within the legislation 
for dealing with disputes as to the amount of the demand.8  The Report went on to identify that 
there should be three grounds for challenging the demand, being:9 
• there is a substantial dispute as to whether the debt is owing; 
                                                          
3 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/  
Accessed 21 February 2013. This is referred to throughout as the Harmer Report. 
4 Assaf F., Statutory Demands: Law and Practice, 2nd ed,LexisNexis, Sydney, 2012 at [1.21] where it is stated 
that “It was not until the enactment of the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992(Cth), which implemented many of 
the recommendations made by the Harmer Report, that the statutory demand procedure was radically 
altered. Indeed, immediately prior to the Corporate Law Reform Act coming into effect, the Corporations Law 
retained virtually the same statutory demand procedure as the original 1856 Act.” 
5 The Report of the Commission was handed down in 1988. 
6 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/  
Accessed 21 February 2013. At [148] 
7 This issue has  been raised  by Karen O’Flynn in her unpublished  paper The  Harmer Amendments: 15 years  
on available at http://www.claytonutz.com/people/oflynn_karen/docs/UNSW_insolvency_paper.pdf 
Accessed  21 February 2013 
8 ibid 
9 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/ Accessed 21 February 2013. At [150] 
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• the company appears to have a counter-claim which may exceed the amount of the debt; or 
• the demand ought to be set aside on other grounds. 
The Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth) was enacted largely to give effect to the model suggested 
by the Harmer Report.10 It did not, however, follow the proposed wording exactly. The legislation as 
enacted is what still operates with a requirement to challenge the demand within 21 days.11 There is 
also the limited basis upon which the challenge may be made under either s 459H or 459J. 
The Explanatory Memorandum suggests12 that the “provisions in relation to the setting aside of a 
statutory demand are intended to be a complete code for the resolutions of disputes involving 
statutory demands..” However, as is discussed below in respect of the case law developed since that 
time, whilst there is no doubt that the  Harmer Report was concerned with difficulties in determining 
whether the  defect  in the  demand might  be  sufficient to have  it  set aside, it is not clear that the 
Harmer Report had advocated that the  process be a complete code in the sense of excluding other  
aspects  of the  Corporations  Act.  The  other  aspect  of the  amending legislation  that is  notable  is  
that the provisions ultimately enacted drifted substantially from the elegance of the proposals as put 
forward in the  Harmer  report.13 For example, as discussed above, the Harmer report had suggested 
the straightforward provision that would provide the court with three grounds on which it could set 
a statutory demand aside; namely if it was satisfied there was a substantial dispute whether the 
debt owes; or the company had a counterclaim etc or the demand out to be set aside on other 
grounds. The Commission then went on to recommend that regardless of the grounds for setting 
aside the demand, it should not be set aside by reason only of a defect or irregularity unless the 
Court considered that substantial injustice would be caused if it were not set aside. The legislation 
introduced the poorly worded s 459J (1) that appeared to conflate the “substantial injustice” 
limitation and the third “other grounds” category as suggested by the Commission. Hence much of 
the subsequent confusion has arisen around defects and their impact.  
Whilst the legislation as implemented has its faults it is likely that not all of the problems of the 
current regime can be found in the drafting. Rather, fault may be found with the notions that: 
                                                          
10 See Explanatory Memorandum Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 at [845] 
11 See s459G 
12 Explanatory Memorandum Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 at [848] 
13 In respect of the  provisions  relating to statutory demands see  Australian Law Reform Commission, Report 
No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry Vol 2 available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/vol2_chap1.pdf 
Accessed 21 January 2013. At  WU8 
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a) parties in such circumstances will not engage in any desperate attempt to prevent 
liquidation; and 
b) parties will not use the statutory demand provisions as a debt collection mechanism. 
In addition the interpretation provided by the courts in respect of the legislation has not eased the 
requirements for litigation in this area. These matters are elaborated upon below.       
In June 2004, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services made a 
recommendation that it would be appropriate to review the operation of the law of statutory 
demands.14 It made no recommendations as to how the law might be changed (if at all) in this area. 
So far it would seem no such review has taken place.  
The statutory demand procedure often lies at the heart of the compulsory winding up of an 
insolvent company. Court ordered windings up remain a significant part of the insolvency statistics. 
At the time of writing, the latest ASIC insolvency statistics show that this type of winding up accounts 
for around 26% of the total insolvency appointments.15 Although no data is available on how many 
of these arise because of presumed insolvency following non compliance with a statutory demand, it 
is likely that they represent a substantial percentage of court ordered windings up given the relative 
costs associated alternative methods of proving insolvency.   
What is the underlying purpose of the statutory demand provisions? 
There are well-accepted purposes behind the use of the statutory demand. For example, it is clearly 
a process designed to aid the creditor who being outside of the company, is unable to be certain of 
the insolvency of the company. Insolvency is recognised as being a position of the company based on 
a complete financial picture. In Sandell v Porter it was made clear that insolvency could only be 
established by looking at the whole of the circumstances.16  Thus individual creditors would be put 
to an enormous (and expensive) task if the creditor was obliged to establish this even though it is 
clear that their particular debt remains unpaid.  That is, the individual creditor would normally incur 
large costs if it needed to establish the debtor company’s insolvency. By contrast, a debtor company 
                                                          
14 See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate Insolvency Laws: a 
Stocktake June  2004 at [12.57] available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/?url=corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/ail/report/ail.pdf accessed 4 April 2013. 
15 ASIC Australian insolvency statistics statistics, 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC-insolvency-statistics-series-2-published-
April-2013.pdf/$file/ASIC-insolvency-statistics-series-2-published-April-2013.pdf, accessed 19 April 2013. 
16 Sandell v Porter [1966] HCA 28 at [15] per Barwick CJ.  ‘The conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a 
consideration of the debtor's financial position in its entirety…’ 
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should be well aware of their own financial situation without the need to incur any additional 
marginal costs and, a solvent debtor can pay the relevant debt whereas a debtor who is unable to 
pay can look to the various insolvency procedures available. Accordingly a system that allows for 
effective and efficient determination of the insolvency can be justified. The information asymmetry 
that arises between the creditor and the potentially insolvent corporation can be resolved by the 
statutory demand process.  
There may be other advantages in the demand process from a broader social perspective. The 
Former Justice Austin made the following remarks17 on the benefits of the statutory demand in our 
system of corporate law: 
What struck me..is how important they [statutory demands] are for the work of the court. 
Uncontested winding–up applications based on failure to comply with a statutory demand 
are processed by court registrars like sausages. I suspect that in many cases the application 
is not contested precisely because of the demand, failure to comply with which has placed 
the onus on the company to prove that it is solvent. Just think of the effect that abolition of 
the statutory demand would have on the volume of judicial work. Insolvency would have to 
be proved in every case, many more cases would be contested, and the wheels of justice 
would be clogged. I can think of no better contributor than the statutory demand to the just, 
quick and cheap administration of justice in commercial litigation.  
However, it is also clear that the statutory demand procedure is open to the possibility of abuse of 
process. The position of the debtor where a dispute has arisen is clearly at a disadvantage if the 
creditor seeks to use the process to place pressure on the debtor. Therefore it is recognised that 
some balance needs to be struck. A well resourced creditor who has a relatively low marginal cost in 
issuing a demand is in a very strong position under the current provisions as the debtor is put to the 
cost of acting to set aside the demand within a short time period. It has been suggested that the 
procedure is a “powerful and attractive weapon”18 particularly for the Australian Taxation Office 
which is entitled to issue the demand despite any objection raised by a taxpayer company in respect 
of an assessment.19 In an ideal insolvency world, a creditor  who is in dispute with a corporation will 
have that dispute resolved in court and then seek to levy execution to have their judgement 
enforced. It would only be where the judgement debt process fails that the creditor would seek 
winding  up. However, the statutory demand process provides creditors with a much cheaper and 
                                                          
17 Austin RP writing in the Foreword to Assaf, F. Statutory Demands: Law and Practice LexisNexis, Sydney, 2008 
at v-vi. 
18 Assaf F. ‘Statutory Demands- the taxman’s weapon of  choice’ Financial Fallout, December 2008 at 93 
19 DC of  T v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 41 
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quicker initial option for resolving disputes over debts and the litigation path remains open to the 
creditor if necessary. So despite the  occasional negative  comment by the  courts  in terms  of  not  
using the  process to pursue  disputed debts, the  economic reality is that it  will occur. 
The difficulty lays in finding where the balance should be between facilitating the winding–up of 
insolvent companies and avoiding placing too much pressure on debtors where there is a genuine 
commercial dispute.  The protection afforded to the debtor company in situations of dispute was 
developed by the courts soon after the demand procedure was introduced. In Quadrant 
Constructions,20 Finklestein J noted that the development of the statutory demand process was as 
followed by21 
… the courts [establishing] the rule that a winding up proceeding should not be used to 
recover a disputed debt: …The proper course was to bring an action for the debt:... If in 
breach of the rule a petition was presented it would be either stood over or dismissed to 
prevent an abuse of the court’s process..except in special circumstances such as where the 
creditor was without remedy if denied the right to proceed and where no other creditors of 
the company were prejudiced:... If a petition was threatened its presentation could be 
enjoined to prevent an abuse of process: ..All this was well-known by the end of the 19th 
century. Of course, there were occasions when the rule was ignored. Sometimes a person 
claiming to be a creditor would present a petition, or threaten to do so, to put pressure on 
the company to acknowledge a debt or compromise a claim. But, as the law reports indicate, 
the occasions on which this occurred were few. 
This suggests that there was, before the changes following Harmer, some balance in the approach of 
the courts. It may be that this balance was not reflected in the legislative amendments and the 
courts were not able to be flexible in their approach as a result. Following the 1992 amendments, 
the position of a debtor under the current Australian regime is somewhat different. Any debtor who 
now feels that a creditor is “bludgeoning” the company into payment is effectively forced to take 
action via s 459G within the specified time period. To do otherwise is to risk an application being 
made to wind up the company on the basis of insolvency and the possible trigger of lending defaults. 
The provision of a “code” as a response to the issuing of a statutory demand has channelled all 
disputes and desperate claims through the courts. The ability to obfuscate the winding up process by 
challenging the statutory demand is assisted by some unclear language in s 459J(1). In addition, it 
                                                          
20 Quadrant Constructions Pty Ltd v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd, in the matter of Quadrant Constructions Pty Ltd 
[2004] FCA 111 
21 ibid at [1]-[2] case references omitted 
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has been pointed out that the allegation of a disputed debt, or alternatively a counter claim, is also 
quick to be made by some debtors but requires adjudication in a Supreme or Federal Court. Thus  it  
might  be asked whether the  advantages  identified above  in terms  of  saving  of  court time  are  
not  reduced by the possible abuse of the  statutory demand process.  
What is the proper role for a demand? 
What of the place of the demand process within our corporate insolvency law more generally? The 
balancing of rights between a debtor and creditors is at the heart of much of the tension in the law 
of insolvency. One key aspect of law reform in insolvency has been in seeking to facilitate corporate 
rescue.22 The development of the voluntary administration process occurred at the same time as the 
changes made in the demand process, but there seems to have been little consideration of how the 
demand process might impact in the rescue regime.  Harris and Legg23 have commented that: 
 An effective rescue culture will have both informal and formal legal processes that work co-
operatively to facilitate attempts to maximise the value of the business in financial distress. 
Both of these procedures need to work together, and the conduct of each is done in the 
shadow of liquidation and a potential fire sale of the assets, a situation where usually 
everyone is worse off. 
If it is accepted that liquidation is potentially a process which is inferior from a creditor’s perspective, 
then it may be asked whether provisions that facilitate the liquidation in the form of the statutory 
demand might not be counterproductive.  However, it can also be noted that there are arguments 
that might be presented against this sentiment if it were taken to be some indication that liquidation 
ought not be facilitated. First, it is by no means clear that liquidation necessarily leads to lower 
returns to creditors in any particular case. Generally, we can say that there is not a great deal of 
evidence indicating clearly better returns in a rescue situation. Whilst there is some anecdotal 
evidence of some voluntary administrations24 providing better returns we await anything definitive 
on this point. Further, even accepting that many company circumstances will favour a corporate 
rescue, there will undoubtedly still be situations where liquidation is the only commercial possibility 
and any attempt at a rescue would simply be wasted time and money.  Second, the statutory 
                                                          
22 See for example Keay A., ‘A Comparative Analysis of Administration Regimes in Australia and the United 
Kingdom’ in Omar P (Ed) International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives, Ashgate 2008 at 105. See 
also Anderson and Morrison ‘The Commencement of Company rescue: How and When does it Start?’ at 83. 
23 Harris J and Legg M ‘What price investor protection? Class actions vs corporate rescue’ (2009) 17 Insolvency 
Law  Journal 185 at 194 
24 Coad S., ‘The Australian Society of CPAs Survey of the First Year of Voluntary Administrations’ in Lessing J. 
And Corkery J. (Eds) Corporate Insolvency Law, Bond University, 1995, 49;Australian Securities Commission, 
ASC Research Paper 98/01: A Study of Voluntary Administrations in New South Wales at 18-19. 
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demand process may somewhat ironically in fact assist in initiating a voluntary administration 
because  it  will cause the  directors of a company to face the potential insolvency. If the board has 
been ignoring the insolvency, a statutory demand may cause them to seek appropriate advice and 
look to ways of rescuing the company. Therefore, the statutory demand process remains vital to the 
needs of creditors. However, as we have stated, the balance between creditor and debtor interests 
must be struck in a way that leads to the best outcomes for all parties and it is somewhat likely that 
excessive litigation will be wasteful for both parties and hence the broader community as well.  
In summary, therefore, it is argued that the demand procedure provides an effective means for a 
creditor to deal with their information asymmetry about the company’s overall financial position. 
There are potential benefits at a public level as courts are not faced with dealing with detailed 
evidence about the financial position of the company. However, there needs to be a recognition that 
the process is open to abuse in situations where debts are in dispute or a counterclaim is available. 
The approach of the courts prior to the 1992 amendments sought to deal with this issue. 
Nevertheless, since 1993 the strict legalistic manner in which the system operates potentially 
detracts from both the broader benefits  of  having reduced court time  dealing with these issues 
and  also from the  ability of  debtors  to challenge  the  demand. Finally, whether the demand 
process helps or hinders corporate rescue is not entirely obvious. The legalistic form of the current 
challenge provisions may suggest, at the very least, a potential for discouraging rescue which is in 
conflict with the current direction of insolvency law reform trends. The effect of the changes in this 
respect is unclear as there is a possibility that indirect impacts may work in other ways.  
Despite all of these matters, it is argued  that there remains a need for the statutory demand in the 
winding-up of companies and so in the next part of the paper we consider some of the current issues 
being faced by the courts. 
 
Current Legislation 
Whatever is thought of the broader purpose of the demand procedure it is necessary to examine the 
actual provisions and their interpretation in order to provide an effective evaluation. The current 
legislation has now been in operation for over fifteen years. During this time there has been a 
significant amount of litigation reported around the operation of the process25. Whilst it  would  be  
expected that new  legislation may require a period of time  before  matters are  clarified, there have  
                                                          
25 see Assaf F., Statutory Demands: Law and Practice, 2nd ed, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2012. 
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been a number  of  areas where uncertainty has  remained. The purpose of this section of the paper 
is not to deal with the provisions in any detail. Indeed part of the difficulty with this area is that so 
much case law26 has developed in this relatively short period that this in itself detracts from the 
efficacy of the provisions.27 That is, while the legislation was introduced as a “code” in order to 
provide a clear set of processes and to reduce litigation around statutory demands, the reality has 
been the opposite.28 It has succeeded in effectively eliminating disputes over the demand being 
argued at the hearing stage but it has by no means eliminated the disputes themselves, only the 
timing of those disputes. As long ago as 1998, Keay commented29 that  
..it is submitted that the present state of the law is untenable, as the intention of the 
legislature in introducing a code to simplify the statutory demand procedure and to produce 
time savings for the courts has not been achieved. 
Whilst it might be suggested that issues around unpaid debts and insolvency ought to be resolved in 
a legal setting30, it is surely beneficial if matters were able to be clearly understood by directors and 
those in business generally rather than frequently requiring court adjudication.  
It is not the intention in this paper to examine the provisions of the legislation and the case law that 
interprets and applies them in any comprehensive manner.31 Rather we seek to highlight some areas 
that we suggest demonstrate a need to consider reforms.  One area which has generated 
controversy is the question as to whether solvency of the debtor company ought to be a basis for 
setting aside a demand.  A leading text in the insolvency area suggests32 that there is some 
‘uncertainty’ over this issue though the ‘prevailing view’ is that it is not relevant. In Kekatos and 
Another v Holmark Construction Co Pty Ltd 33,Young J made the statement that ‘[o]rdinarily, a 
                                                          
26 For  example  the  dedicated text  on statutory demands is  over  500 pages in length: see Assaf F., Statutory 
Demands: Law and Practice, 2nd ed, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2012. 
27 See Karen O’Flynn in her unpublished  paper The  Harmer Amendments: 15 years  on available at 
http://www.claytonutz.com/people/oflynn_karen/docs/UNSW_insolvency_paper.pdf Accessed 21 January 
2012where it is stated [at 9] that ‘..it is clear that, as well as the  usual disputes about the existence or 
quantum of debts, the current statutory demand regime is a technical nightmare. ‘ 
28 See the discussion above at p 2 
29 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the  Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and  
Securities Law Journal 122 at 138 
30 It has been suggested that ‘No instructions are sweeter than those that require counsel to seek to set aside a 
wanton statutory demand.’ Aitken L., and Stowe H ‘Issues in corporate insolvency: Statutory demands and 
Corporations Act, s440A (2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 182. The author in this article does go on to state 
though that the law is “reasonably clear” which may be an overstatement in some respects.  
31 Indeed our point is that such are the number of cases generated under the present system, it would be 
impossible to do so short of a lengthy work. For such an attempt to do so see Assaf F., Statutory Demands: 
Law and Practice, 2nd ed,LexisNexis, Sydney, 2012 
32 Gronow M., McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation Thomson Reuters, online, 2012 at [3.690] 
33 121 FLR 39 at 40 
11 
 
company is expected to put its claim that it is not insolvent at the stage of resisting a statutory 
demand.’ This statement flies in the face of most of the reasoning in other cases.34 In particular the 
comment of Landers J in Master Paving Pty Ltd v Heading Contractors Pty Ltd35  makes it clear that it 
would  be ‘inappropriate’ for a debtor company to say in response to a demand that it  need not pay 
because it was solvent. The statement by Lander J was heavily criticised by Keay36 as being ‘very 
creditor oriented’. He pointed out the fact that it was necessary to obtain leave at the winding–up 
hearing and also because it goes against a principle reason for introducing the  code  in Part  5.4 in 
the  first place,  namely to enable disputes to be  sorted earlier and to reduce costs. Keay’s criticisms 
were in turn rebuffed by O’Gorman37 who argued that as the statutory scheme provided for 
insolvency to be determined at the winding-up hearing stage, the sensible position for a solvent 
debtor is to deal with the demand by some form of payment or compound with the creditor. 
O’Gorman also argued that the nature of the challenge to a statutory demand makes it an 
inappropriate mechanism for dealing with the detailed questions required to prove solvency. 
There is clearly some merit in both sides of the argument here and the difficulty with resolving this 
issue might be illustrated in Paperlinx Ltd v Skidmore38 where the creditor had been engaged in 
lengthy wrongful dismissal proceedings against the debtor company. The creditor issued a statutory 
demand which the company paid part of, but argued that it was obliged to retain a certain amount 
to comply with tax obligations. The creditor refused to accept this part payment as the end of the 
demand and claimed it was entitled to proceed to the winding-up application. The debtor company 
was clearly solvent and was listed on the ASX. In looking at the action of the creditor Finklestein J 
made39 the following comment  
When I asked … whether the defendant intended to move for the plaintiff’s winding up 
based on its purported failure to comply with the statutory demand Mr Scerri sensibly 
acknowledged that his client did not. It would have been better if Mr Scerri’s client had said 
so much earlier. In that event there would not have been any need for this application, the 
parties [sic] time would not have been wasted and legal expenses would have been avoided. 
Unfortunately that did not happen. The defendant kept alive the threat of winding up 
                                                          
34 See for example Liverpool Cement Renderers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Landmarks Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd (1996) 
19 ACSR 411 
35 (1997) 15 ACLC 1.025 at 1,032 
36 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the  Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and  
Securities Law Journal 122 at 134 
37 O’Gorman K., ‘Sidestepping the statutory demand: is solvency a solution?’ (2002) 10 Insolvency Law Journal 
239 
38 [2004] FCA 1624 
39 [2004] FCA 1624 at [7] 
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proceedings and in the result I have an application to set aside the statutory demand which 
must now be disposed of. 
The creditor argued that it was not possible to set aside the demand simply because the debtor was 
solvent. Finklestein J decided that the position was not so clear cut. Instead he held that whether 
solvency is relevant depends on the circumstances and, in circumstances such as this, the threat of a 
winding up process which the creditor does not intended to proceed with is an abuse of process that 
justifies setting the demand aside. Undoubtedly this  was a sensible  outcome given the facts  of the 
case but  it goes  to demonstrate the  difficulty faced by a solvent debtor  in certain  circumstances. 
When will they be able to be certain that the creditor is acting by way of an abuse of process? How 
might this be determined within the time frame required to set aside the demand. It will always be 
prudent for a debtor to apply to have the demand set aside as otherwise negative consequences 
potentially flow but it maybe an expensive exercise if it is rejected and the court determines the 
matter should be argued at the winding up stage.   
A second example of the difficulties in the provisions relates to the requirement in s 459E that the 
demand be in the prescribed form40 which is Form 509H. The form requires41 that the address for 
service must be in the State or Territory in which the demand is served on the company. This 
requirement in the form is clearly for the benefit of the debtor. As Bryne J42 explained in respect of 
the requirement: 
 Given the serious consequences for the debtor of a failure to make application under 
s 459G and the inflexible time frame within which this must be done, it is important that 
there be no room for doubts [sic] to these matters. It was doubtless with this in mind that 
the prescribed form ... was prepared with par 6 included.    
However what is the situation where the address for service is not the same State or Territory as to 
where the debtor is served? Clearly that represents a defect in the demand. However, because of 
the strict requirements under s 459G any challenge must be made in accordance with that section. 
The argument that by failing to provide such an address, the demand fails to comply with the 
requirements to such an extent that the demand is not a demand that complies with Part 5.4, has 
                                                          
40 Corporations Regulations 1.0.03 
41 Paragraph 6 is as follows: The address of the creditor for service of copies of any application and affidavit is 
(insert the address for service of the documents in the State or Territory in which the demand is served on the 
company, being, if solicitors are acting for the creditor, the address of the solicitors). 
42 Marlan Financial Services Pty Ltd v New England Agricultural Traders Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 435 at [12] 
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been rejected.43 This results in the debtor being required to effectively pay for the error of the 
creditor by way of serving the challenge interstate. Service interstate will require compliance with 
the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 which overrides the Corporations Act in respect of 
service.44  The facts in Marlan Financial Services45 illustrate the point of difficulty here and produce a 
result that Bryne J described as ‘remarkable’. In that case the corporate creditor inserted an 
interstate address for service in the statutory demand which the debtor, in turn, used to serve the 
documents under s 459G. However because this was not the registered address of the creditor 
company, the service was not effective for the purposes of the Service and Execution of Process Act. 
The court is left in a difficult position in these types of circumstances as they are bound by 
limitations imposed under s 459G. There is no clear remedy for the debtor and no inconvenience or 
sanction provided for the creditor.   There have been attempts to overcome this difficulty by some 
creative orders. In Re Beralt Pty Ltd46 Ambrose J did make a declaration that there was non-
compliance with the requirements of the demand and that this meant it was insufficient to support 
an application to wind-up the company. In Ultimate Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Lyell Morris Pty Ltd47, 
Master Mahoney made an order that if any winding up application was made, the creditor inform 
the court that: 
    (a) the demand on which the winding up application is made was held defective in that it 
did not specify an address of the respondent for service in Victoria; 
    (b) it was also held that the applicant had not made an application under s 459G but that 
this was due to the defect and was not the fault of the applicant; 
    (c) it was further held that if there were a winding up application based on the defective 
demand the respondent could expect to be required to show cause why s 467A(b) should 
not apply so as to require that the application be dismissed — 
and further that a copy of the order as authenticated be attached to the winding up application. 
It appears though that Bryne J doubted the correctness of this type of order in Marlan Financial 
Services.48  
                                                          
43 See Sustainable Organics (Wooshaway) Pty Ltd v Ranger Loaders Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 45. 
44 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) s9(9) 
45 Marlan Financial Services Pty Ltd v New England Agricultural Traders Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 435 at [16] 
46 (2001) Qd R 232; [1999] QSC 202 
47 (1995) 13 ACLC 1,268 at 1,271 
48 Marlan Financial Services Pty Ltd v New England Agricultural Traders Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 435 at [43] 
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Even if it is accepted that there are possible situations where the court will make some form of 
injunctive relief in these circumstances, the process is an expensive and uncertain one.49 Whilst it 
might be argued that debtors should be aware of the requirements of serving  documents interstate, 
it is suggested here that this is  an example  of the unnecessarily legalistic nature  of the  of the  
process.     
There are other difficulties with the provisions several of which have been well documented. Some 
of these (and by no means an exhaustive list) are: 
• In relation to the disputed debt under s 459H, while the law appears to be is relatively clear 
there remains some variation in the emphasis in explaining a ‘disputed debt’.50 As Keay51 has 
stated ‘[t]he problem in this area is not so much the state of the law, but the huge volume of 
cases that are being decided.’ As noted above the impact of the scheme of the legislation is 
that all disputes whether genuine or not get channelled to the courts. 
• The well litigated issue  of the meaning of  s 459J(1)(a) and (b) in terms of whether defects 
are  confined to s 459J(1)(a) seems to have  been resolved following the  decision in Spencer 
Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd52 . However, Gronow suggests that the view 
that the court may face defects in the demand of such magnitude that it can be set aside 
under s 459J(1)(b) ’has had some supporters’.53  
• To what extent can a deficiency be so great that the document cannot be considered a 
demand? This point was raised in NT Resorts Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 54 
but it is difficult in practical terms to see how such an argument might succeed given the 
definition of statutory demand in s 9.55 This difficulty was noted by Douglas J in Nasrawi 
Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Bryne Earthmoving & Engineering Pty Ltd.56 Again, it may be 
asked if the balance has swung too far in favour of the creditor who issues the demand.  
• There has been a recent issue with respect to s459E and whether it is possible to issue a 
demand for part of the debt only. It was found by Blue in Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd v M 
                                                          
49 See also Peak Hill Manganese Pty Ltd v Hydraplant Equipment Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 120 at [72] 
50 See for example Re Morris Catering (Aust) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601;  Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & 
M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452; Scanhill Pty Ltd v Century 21 Australasia Pty Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 451; 
Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785 
51 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the  Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and  
Securities Law Journal 122 at 138; see also Polaroid Australia Pty Ltd v Minicomp Pty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 529 
52 (1997) 76 FCR 452 
53 Gronow M., McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation Thomson Reuters, online, 2012 at [3.660] referring to 
Wildtown Holdings Pty Ltd v Rural Traders Co Pty Ltd (2002) 172 FLR 35. 
54 (1998) 38 ATR 425 
55 This is that a statutory demand means ‘(a) a document that is, or purports to be, a demand served under 
section 459E.’ This seems to suggest that anything will do provide it purports to be a demand!  
56 [2005] QSC 002 at [6] 
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& I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd, 57 that purpose of s 459E led to the conclusion that a statutory 
demand could not be made for what his Honour described as 'an undissected portion' of a 
debt because it would require the company debtor to challenge the whole of the debt in 
order to establish a genuine dispute.58 Further the wording of the section was limited to 
claiming all of the debt because it refers specifically to ‘the debt’. The Western Australia 
Court of Appeal, however, rejected this reasoning in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v 
Garuda Aviation Pty Ltd59 where Newnes JA, argued that such a limitation was not supported 
by the language and context in s459E. Whilst this decision may end this dispute, what it does 
show is that creditors are seeking ways to avoid the possible costs and delay associated with 
the challenge under s 459H. 
• There are a number of issues around the meaning of ‘some other reason’ in s 459J(1)(b). 
One is whether an impending appeal may be a reason to set aside the demand. Some cases 
suggest it is possible.60 Others suggest this is not enough to constitute some other reason.61 
• The issue around the tight time frame and how this has coloured all balance of rights 
between the debtor and the creditor has been a key feature of the changes implemented 
following Harmer. The High Court in the David Grant62 case made it clear that the legislative 
intention and language implying quick resolution of the issues around the statutory demand 
limit the ability to utilise other ameliorating provisions in the Corporations Act. Whilst this is 
consistent with the statutory language it can nevertheless be asked whether this suggests 
the legislation is in need of a change to provide more balance. The decision in Aussie Vic 
Plant Hire63  has demonstrated the  ‘harshness’64 of these  influences and as Lipton has 
asked:65   
The court’s approach really leaves one to question whether the judiciary has gone 
too far in applying such timeframes and has become too process focused.. Any 
notion of substantive justice it seems has been thrown out the window at the cost of 
commercial certainty. 
                                                          
57 [2011] SASC 165. 
58 [2011] SASC 165 at [51]. 
59 [2013] WASCA 61. 
60 See Eumina Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1998) 16 ACLC 1440; Midas Management Pty Ltd v 
Equator Communications Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 759; Ozy Homewares Pty Ltd v Wesgordon Pty Ltd [2007] 
NSWSC 982. 
61 Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (2010) 28 ACLC 249 
62 David Grant & Co Pty Ltd  v Westpac Banking  Corp [1995] HCA 43 
63 Aussie Vic  Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd [2008] HCA 9 
64 David Grant & Co Pty Ltd  v Westpac Banking  Corp [1995] HCA 43  
65 Lipton J ‘Extending the time for compliance with a statutory demand-A need for commercial certainty’ 
(2008) 16 Insolvency Law Journal 211 at 220 
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Recommendations for reform 
As stated above, if a debtor company does not take an action under s 459G to set aside the statutory 
demand, it risks being made to wind up. In addition, s 459S(1) precludes a debtor company from 
opposing an application winding up on any grounds that it relied on for the purpose of having the 
statutory demand set aside and, more importantly, could have relied on but did not so rely. The 
effect of these two provisions means that a debtor company that does not apply to the court to set 
aside statutory demand will be later penalised for not doing so in a potential application for winding 
up.66  As we have shown, it may be that a creditor is using the statutory demand mechanism as a 
debt collection method regardless of the solvency of a company. Furthermore, as a matter of 
commercial reality, there may be legitimate reasons that a debtor company has deferred payment of 
a particular debt, without the company necessarily being insolvent. Under the current framework, 
once a demand served the risk lies purely with the debtor company. Therefore, if the debtor 
company wishes to oppose the winding–up, it must take the matter to court. That is, there are no 
real penalties imposed on the creditor under the current regime for using the statutory demand for 
purposes other than determining the solvency of the debtor company, other than the awarding of 
costs under s 459N. This means that issuing a statutory demand when a debt is owed is a fairly 
straightforward issue from the creditor’s point of view. Certainly it is much simpler and cheaper than 
pursuing execution of a judgment debt. However, from the debtor’s point of view, there are very 
significant reasons for the debtor company to take the matter to court. This forced litigation can be 
seen as wasteful and inconsistent with the underlying purpose of an insolvency regime aimed at fast 
and efficient processes.. It is, therefore, argued that further reform is needed in order to balance the 
rights of the debtor company and its creditors. A number of changes have been suggested to 
improve the process. This section examines some of these. 
One mechanism may be to deter creditor claims by introducing a higher minimum amount. The 
question as to what the minimum amount should be was raised by the Commission in the Harmer 
Report. After some debate, the Commission opted for a minimum amount which was considered low 
enough to ensure that smaller creditors would have the ability to issue a statutory demand, but 
                                                          
66 Section 459S does provide partial relief in that the debtor may seek leave of the court to oppose the demand 
on the winding-up action, however, that will apply only if the ground for not bringing an action under s 459G 
is material to proving that the company is solvent (s 459S(2)). It is arguable that this mechanism merely 
creates the need for further litigation. 
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sufficiently high enough to “remove the likelihood of trivial claims.”67 Specifically, the Commission 
recommended that the prescribed minimum amount be set at $2,000 by the regulation, so that it 
could be increased without the need to amend by legislation. Given that the Harmer Report was 
tabled in 1988, there should (at the very least) be a review of this amount.68 However, it may be 
more prudent for the regulation to set a base amount which is indexed on an annual basis. This 
would not necessarily preclude the need for further review of the minimum amount, but it would at 
least address general economic growth. 
While this option would deter trivial matters being raised by way of issuing a statutory demand, 
there is also a need to ensure that only disputes that are “genuine” are bought to the court. 
Therefore, another mechanism might be to introduce a costs regime that penalises directors of 
debtor companies where there is no “genuine dispute” as to the debt owed.69 This might discourage 
directors from engaging in an action for setting aside statutory demands for the predominant 
purpose of postponing the winding-up of the company. Although costs may be awarded against the 
debtor company under the current regime, a more personal director’s liability would be stronger 
deterrent. 
As this paper has identified, one of the key issues with the statutory demand regime as it currently 
operates relates to the poor wording adopted by the legislation, particularly in relation to s 459J. 
Therefore, a further reform measure might simply be to redraft the legislation, particularly ss 459H 
and 459J, to reflect the original intentions of the Harmer Report. It appears that the overall intention 
of the current regime was to adopt the Commission’s recommendations in relation to the grounds 
for setting aside statutory demands.70 However, it appears that the legislation as ultimately drafted 
introduced, perhaps inadvertently, a two part test to the question of ‘defects’; that is first the Court 
must be satisfied a substantial injustice would result where it is argued that there is a defect in the 
demand, and second, for “some other reason”, which appears to preclude issues related to defects 
                                                          
67 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry, available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/ Accessed 21 January 2012. At [146] 
68 It is worth noting that a review was carried out in relation to the comparison amount in the bankruptcy 
notices, which as a result of that review is now set at $5,000. See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 41. 
69 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and 
Securities Law Journal 122 at 137. Keay notes that this power does already in the courts but the  court may 
need to be  encouraged to use it through legislation. 
70 See for example, Explanatory Memorandum Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 at [685] – [688], where it was 
noted that the Harmer Report had recommended that a demand be set aside where the Court was satisfied 
there was a substantial dispute as to whether the debt is owed, or the company appears to have a 
counterclaim etc, or the demand out to be set aside on other grounds. It was considered that the “other 
grounds” power would “enable the Court to take account of matters such as improper or invalid service and 
mistakes or misstatements in the notice of the demand, in circumstances where this would significantly 
prejudice any party.” 
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in the demand.71 As we have argued above, the current wording of s 459J has resulted in confusion 
around defects in statutory demands and to what extent those defects may be grounds for setting 
aside the demand. The advantage of the wording originally recommended by the Commission is its 
simplicity and clarity, while still providing some discretion to the Court. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
a general “other” clause that is limited in scope to issues that result in substantial injustice provides 
a safeguard against litigation that is carried out by the debtor company merely to defer payment of 
the debt. 
Another reform might be to adopt an approach similar to that in bankruptcy, where a creditor must 
secure a judgment debt before being able to issue the bankruptcy notice.72 At the time of Harmer 
Report, it was put to the Commission that this option would place the onus on creditors to ensure 
that the statutory demand was not used merely as a debt collection mechanism. However, the 
Commission was of the view that this approach could not be justified.73 In any event, it is difficult to 
see how this would address the need to reduce litigation.74 
One way to alleviate litigation, at least at the Supreme Court/Federal Court level, would be to 
introduce mechanisms that allow the lower courts to deal with statutory demands. In the Harmer 
Report, the Commission recommended that the legislation include a power to confer jurisdiction for 
determining applications to set aside statutory demands on the lower courts on the basis that “[t]his 
would relieve the Supreme Courts of the burden of determining issues of disputed debt where the 
amount in issue is less than what would normally be dealt with by a Supreme Court (whether 
‘beneath the dignity’ of that Court or not).”75 Alternatively, the current regime could be amended to 
establish a tribunal body charged with the responsibility of dealing with the more routine disputes. 
Clearly, relieving the Supreme Court from the volume of statutory demand cases was an important 
                                                          
71 See Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452, c/f Topfelt Pty Ltd v State 
Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 226. 
72 See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 41. 
73 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry, referring to the 
submission of the National Credit Managers Association (Vic), available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/ Accessed 21 January 2012. At [144] 
74 See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and  Financial Services, Corporate Insolvency Laws: a 
Stocktake June  2004 at [12.57] available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=corporations_ctte/co
mpleted_inquiries/2002-04/ail/index.htm 
accessed January 21 2012  
75 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry, referring to the decision of 
Young J in FAI Insurances Ltd v Goldleaf Interior Decorators Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 736 that any claim under 
$2,000 would be prima facie beneath the dignity of the court, available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/ Accessed 21 January 2012. At [152] 
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objective of the Harmer Report.76 However, this recommendation was not adopted, nor does it 
appear that it was given any consideration in drafting the legislation.  
One other  suggestion which has  been proposed  by O’Flynn is that the  1992 amendments are  
reversed  and the  pre-Harmer  position is  installed.77 She notes that apart from the inconsistency in 
the courts there was little wrong with the previous system. There was, in her view, very little 
litigation compared to the current system and it did not operate ‘harshly’. It seems that given the  
legislation has moved now  to  a national system it  may be  that there would  be  less inconsistency 
between the  courts in various states than was the  case in the  1980’s. Certainly, a reduction of the 
current volume of litigation would be a very positive outcome for all parties. However,  the  need for  
some  mechanism to resolve  disputed debts might  still be  needed in some  situations and  it  would  
be  likely that some major  creditors may see a change  of this type  as a diminution of their  position. 
Conclusion 
The original intention of the Harmer Report was to recommend a specific regime in which disputes 
about debt and other issues could be effectively determined by way of a statutory demand, with 
minimal involvement of the court. As this paper has shown, the Commission’s objectives have not 
been achieved. It has been argued in this paper that this is in part due to the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations, but also the result of human nature. There will be no easy solution 
in this area. The position of a company when faced with possible winding-up proceedings will almost 
certainly be to fight on every stage that it can. This means that whatever the law, every possible 
argument or step to stave off the evil day will be made. It is, therefore, suggested that it will not be 
possible to solve all of the problems raised here by simply changing legislation. In addition creditors 
are likely to see any change that makes it more difficult for them to seek a liquidation order as a 
retrograde step.  
Nevertheless it is argued that at least some changes could be made to improve the situation. The 
possibilities raised above as possible solutions may be a starting point. Some detailed analysis of 
what the legislation is seeking to do and even some data on the impact of the current processes 
might be a way forward. Whilst other aspects of the Harmer inspired changes have been re-
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
77 Karen O’Flynn The  Harmer Amendments: 15 years  on available at 
http://www.claytonutz.com/people/oflynn_karen/docs/UNSW_insolvency_paper.pdf 
Accessed  21 January 2012 
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examined perhaps the most definite statement that may be made at this stage is that review of the 
current statutory demand process is well overdue.  
 
